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INCENTIVIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE USE OF GRANTS AND LOANS
Robert T. Greenbaum*
Daniele Bondonio**
INTRODUCTION
In order to encourage businesses to move to or expand in a
particular location, local governments offer a wide variety of incentives
to businesses. These incentives take many forms, ranging from in-kind
assistance, such as infrastructure improvements, to zoning and permit
assistance to job training to various forms of tax abatements. The
incentives are often justified based on economic efficiency grounds if
they can help overcome market failures such as labor immobility, wage
rigidity, information asymmetries, and externalities due to factors such
as urban sprawl.1 Incentives have also been justified in the presence of
inequalities due to factors such as changing macroeconomic conditions,
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TIMMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO BENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? (1991); Robert T. Greenbaum & Daniele
Bondonio, Losing Focus: A Comparative Evaluation of Spatially Targeted
Economic Revitalization Programmes in the US and the EU, 38 REGIONAL
STUD. 319 (2004); Joseph Gyourko, Place-Based Aid Versus People-Based Aid
and the Role of an Urban Audit in a New Urban Strategy, 3 CITYSCAPE: J.
POL’Y DEV. & RES. 205 (1998).
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concentrated poverty, aging infrastructure, or a workforce with skills
that do not match the need of local employers. 2
Two of the most widely used incentives are below-market rate
loans and grants, which both require rather large up-front capital
investments by the offering governments. 3 Because they do not have to
be repaid, grants potentially offer governments a powerful tool for
influencing businesses decisions. However, because loans are repaid,
they potentially offer governments a more economical way to attempt
to sway businesses location and investment choices. Not only is it
unclear which approach is likely to be more effective, also unexplored
is what types of governments are most likely to use grants or loans.
More broadly, governments interchangeably use grants and
subsidized loans to help accomplish diverse goals. As a recent
example, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
was designed to help state and local governments recover from the
Great Recession.4 Based on reports from recipients between February
17, 2009, and December 31, 2010, ARRA provided $213.6 billion in
grants and $7.5 billion in loans in addition to $39.5 billion in contracts. 5
It is still too early to determine the relative effectiveness of various
forms of assistance.
The larger question of the use of grants versus loans is by no
means confined to the field of local economic development. For
example, it is a much more contentious issue in the field of
international aid for economic development. While some contend that
loans impose more discipline on recipient counties and thus lead to the
funding of more fiscally viable projects, others worry that loans can
lead to unsustainable levels of debt in the recipient countries and that

2
Robert T. Greenbaum, Blair D. Russell & Tricia L. Petras, Measuring
the Distribution of Economic Development Tax Incentive Intensity, 24 ECON
DEV. Q. 154 (2010).
3
See Rachel Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don’t
Create Jobs: The Role of Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97, 100 (2000).
4
Nancy Johnson, Does the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Meet Local Needs? 41 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 123, 123-27 (2009).
5
Recipient
Reported
Awards
Map,
RECOVERY.GOV,
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/Recipien
tReportedDataMap.aspx (last updated May 25, 2011).
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grants are therefore to be preferred.6 The financing of higher education
is another area in which both grants and loans are widely used. In a
clever experiment, Field found evidence that students are debt averse. 7
New York University Law students were randomly assigned to two
groups, both receiving financially equivalent financial aid packages.
The students receiving loans that were forgivable if they took lowerpaying public interest law jobs after graduation were less likely to take
that lower-paying job than students who were offered tuition grants that
only had to be repaid in the event that the student chose a higher paying
job.8
This paper explores the logic of local governments offering
grants and loans to businesses as economic development incentives and
draws on a 2009 survey of county and municipal governments to help
discern among the characteristics that are associated with governments
that offer grants, loans, both forms assistance, and neither form of
assistance. While both forms of assistance are found to be used among
governments having had recent economic decline and among
governments facing barriers to economic development, the forward
selection stepwise logit regression analysis finds that a number of
geographic and economic factors can help distinguish between grant
and loan offering governments.9 In what follows, the authors first
discuss the broader use and adoption of economic development
incentives and then couch the use of grants and loans within the
broader theory. Then, there is a description of the empirical model,
survey data, and results. Finally, the conclusion includes comments
about the findings.

6

See Sanjeev Gupta et al., Foreign Aid and Revenue Response: Does the
Composition of Aid Matter? (IMF Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper No.
WP/03/176,
2003),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03176.pdf; see also Wilson E.
Schmidt, The Economics of Charity: Loans versus Grants, 72 J. POL. ECON.
387 (1964).
7
Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence
From a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, 1 AM. ECON. J.:
APPLIED ECON. 1 (2009).
8
Id.
9
See infra Table 8.
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I. ADOPTION OF GRANTS AND LOANS AS AN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOL

Regardless of their effectiveness, 10 economic development
incentives offered directly to firms remain very popular among state
and local governments.11 There are multiple factors that help explain
why a particular government will decide to adopt such incentives,
ranging from the health of the local economy to competition among
communities to the characteristics of the communities themselves.
There are also multiple factors involved in the decision of which
particular incentives to use; below there is discussion of some of the
factors that help distinguish between the use of grants and loans.
The health of the local economy is often found to be one of the
primary factors that affect the decision of whether to adopt economic
development incentives. Communities facing economic distress are
often found to be more likely to adopt incentives because these policies
are often focused on areas with high unemployment or poverty and
lower housing values.12 However, this finding is not universal, and as
Peters and Fisher note, less affluent communities are at a competitive
disadvantage relative to wealthier communities in terms of the ability to
offer generous incentives.13 Part of the difference in findings may also
10

The measured effectiveness varies considerably based on the particular
incentives offered as well as factors such as when and where the programs were
implemented and the monetary value of the incentives. This variation may be a
function of the measurement of different outcomes, use of different statistical
evaluation techniques, as well as a function of offerings in places and times that
vary based on the level of economic and socioeconomic distress, industry
composition, competition, and availability of other forms of government
assistance. For additional discussion of differences in findings across studies,
See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, Commentary: The Failures of Economic
Development Incentives, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 27 (2004).
11
Robert T. Greenbaum & Jim Landers, Why Are State Policy Makers Still
Proponents of Enterprise Zones? What Explains their Action in the Face of a
Preponderance of the Research? 32 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 466 (2009);
Lingwen Zheng & Mildred Warner, Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local
Governments: A Story of Accountability and Policy Learning, 24 ECON. DEV.
Q. 325 (2010).
12
Robert T. Greenbaum, Siting it Right: Do States Target Economic
Distress When Designating Enterprise Zones? 18 ECON. DEV. Q. 67 (2004);
Irene S. Rubin & Herbert J. Rubin, Economic Development Incentives: The
Poor (Cities) Pay More, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 37 (1987); Elaine B. Sharp,
Institutional Manifestations of Accessibility and Urban Economic Development
Polity, 44 W. POL. Q. 129 (1991).
13
See Peters & Fisher, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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be due to policy diffusion over time. For example, when exploring
time to first adoption of a local development incentive, Anderson and
Wassmer found that communities with higher incomes and property
values wait longer to adopt.14 Examining larger-scale programs at the
national and supranational levels in the United State and the European
Union, Greenbaum and Bondonio similarly found that initial rounds of
programming targeted more distressed areas than did subsequent
rounds.15 The spread to less-distressed areas may be due to political
pressures, whether they be at the stage of implementation in order to
gain political approval16 or at later stages when it is difficult to end
programs that are no longer needed or are ineffective. 17
Another factor influencing the decision to offer incentives is that
communities may believe that they need to offer incentives to compete
with neighboring communities, even if it leads to an inefficient
prisoners’ dilemma outcome. 18 There is empirical support for the
contention that competition leads to incentive use, as Green and
Fleischmann found that local incentives were more likely to be adopted
in areas in which regional competition was more intense. 19 Further,
Anderson and Wassmer found evidence of communities over time
offering incentives based not on their own characteristics but in
response to the offers from other communities. 20
Other factors that have been found to be associated with the
greater likelihood of incentive adoption include size and type of

14

J. E. Anderson & R.W. Wassmer, The Decision to ‘Bid for Business’:
Municipal Behavior in Granting Property Tax Abatements, 25 REGIONAL SCI.
& URB. ECON. 739 (1995).
15
See Greenbaum & Bondonio, supra note 1.
16
Jeffrey S. Lehman, Updating Urban Policy, in CONFRONTING POVERTY:
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 226 (Sheldon H. Danziger et al. eds., 1994).
17
See Field, supra note 7; Dafna Schwartz, Joseph Pelzman & Michael
Keren, The Ineffectiveness of Location Incentive Programs, 22 ECON. DEV. Q.
167 (2008).
18
Stephen Ellis & Cynthia Rogers, Local Economic Development as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma: The Role of Business Climate, 30 REV. OF REGIONAL
STUD. 315 (2000).
19
Gary P. Green & Arnold Fleischmann, Promoting Economic
Development: A Comparison of Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan
Communities, 27 URB. AFF. Q. 145 (1991).
20
See Anderson & Wassmer, supra note 14.
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municipality. Higher population,21 more densely populated areas,22 and
growing communities23 were more likely to adopt. Further, both
central cities and rural areas were found to use incentives more
intensely than suburbs.24
Given that a local government has made the decision to offer
economic development incentives, there remains the issue of the form
of the incentives. Different forms of incentives have been popular at
different times, and they vary among attraction strategies, business
retention efforts, and broader efforts to improve the attractiveness and
social conditions of the local area.25 Reese and Sands refer to the
different trends of policy approaches over time as “fads,” ranging from
approaches that focus on base industries that can export goods and
services outside of the local economy, to approaches that focus on
clusters of similar firms, to policies that focus on attracting the highly
mobile “creative class.”26
As an important part of many of these approaches, local
governments use grants and loans to both attract and retain business
activity. Compared to other popular incentives such as tax abatements,
which represent foregone future tax revenues and can be thought of as
“tax expenditures,” both grants and loans typically require larger upfront capital investments from the government.
Loan programs can take numerous forms, but in most cases they
include making subsidized below-market interest rate financing
available to local businesses. These “soft loans” may also include
repayment terms that are more flexible than those offered by
commercial financial institutions. Soft loans can be useful to help
businesses overcome credit market imperfections, which may limit the
ability of new and small firms to finance otherwise viable projects.27
21

Arnold Fleischmann, Gary P. Green & Tsz Man Kwong, What’s a City
to Do? Explaining Differences in Local Economic Development Policies, 45 W.
POL. Q. 677 (1992).
22
See Greenbaum, supra note 12.
23
Laura A. Reese, Municipal Fiscal Health and Tax Abatement Policy, 5
ECON. DEV. Q. 23 (1991).
24
See Fleischmann, Green & Kwong, supra note 21.
25
See Zheng & Warner, supra note 11.
26
Laura Reese & Gary Sands, Creative Class and Economic Prosperity:
Old Nostrums, Better Packaging? 22 ECON. DEV. Q. 3 (1998).
27
Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Counterfactual Impact
Evaluation of Enterprise Support Policies: An Empirical Application to EU CoSponsored, National and Regional Programs (Ohio State Univ. John Glenn
Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper, 2010), available at
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Further, by the government either lending directly to the firms or by
backing those loans, this can help the firms establish the credit records
necessary to be able to borrow in the future from private financial
institutions.
Grants can be thought of as forgivable loans. In that sense, they
represent both a larger subsidy to the business and a larger cost to the
government. By providing the larger business subsidy, they have the
potential to have greater influence on altering business decisions in the
manner desired by the offering government. However, the fact that
they are not repaid makes them more costly to the local government,
which can lead to greater fiscal stress. 28 Indeed, many lending
programs are set up as “revolving loans,” in which the money paid back
(with interest) to the government can be lent again to other businesses.
This tradeoff between grants potentially having the greater ability
to alter decisions and loans being more cost effective means that a
priori it is not clear which type of incentive is likely to be more
effective in fostering economic development. To examine this
question, Bondonio and Greenbaum used Italian firm level data from
eight national programs, ten regional programs, and seven European
Union co-sponsored programs between 2001 and 2003 to compare the
use of grants and loans.29 Using a three-step conditional difference-indifference model,30 the paper found that employment in firms increased
the more generous the incentives. 31 The paper also found that grants
and loans both induced similar levels of employment, but that the cost
per job was lower for the loans. The implication was that the soft loans
were thus a more fiscally efficient choice compared to grants. 32
One potential drawback from the use of grants or loans for
recipients may be restrictions placed on their use. Graham found that
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/46842/gs_wps_Bondonio_Gre
enbaum_2010-001.pdf?sequence=1.
28
This can result in lower spending elsewhere, higher taxes, or fewer
businesses incentivized.
29
Bondonio & Greenbaum, supra note 27.
30
This model includes a data pre-processing stage in which propensity
score estimation is used to eliminate both the assisted and non-assisted firms
that are outside of the common support. That is, assisted (non-assisted) firms
that have initial observable characteristics not comparable to other non-assisted
(assisted) firms, and thus are not as useful from an evaluation perspective, are
not included in the analysis.
31
Bondonio & Greenbaum, supra note 27.
32
Id.
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grants and loans offered to small businesses in lower Manhattan
subsequent to the September 11, 2001, attacks in some cases may have
worked to the detriment of recipient businesses because of the
requirement that the businesses had to rebuild in lower Manhattan. 33
Indeed, because of the reduced consumer demand after the attacks,
some of the businesses that borrowed the subsidized loans became
highly indebted and unable to pay back the loans due to the locational
disadvantages.34 In other cases, during a slow economy when demand
for loans is low and when commercial interest rates are similar to the
subsidized loans, the restrictions attached to the government loans may
turn off potential borrowers. 35
Because grants and loans are both used for projects that have
larger up-front costs, such as start-up activities, expansions, relocations,
or job training, it is not clear which types of governments will be more
likely to use grants or loans. The next section describes the empirical
methodology used to examine those differences.
II. METHODS AND DATA
In order to help identify the characteristics that help explain
which governments adopt grants or loans as an economic development
tool, both descriptive analysis and regression analysis is used.
Municipal and county governments are categorized based on whether
they offer grants, grants but not loans (“grants only”), loans, loans but
not grants (“loans only”), both grants and loans, or neither grants nor
loans. The descriptive analysis examines whether there is variation
across incentive offers based upon economic performance, economic
development efforts, and perceived barriers to economic development.
The multivariate regression analysis is used to examine the
relationship between individual explanatory factors and the use of
grants or loans while controlling for the impact of other factors.
Because the dependent variable is the use or non-use of grants, loans,
or grants and loans, logit models are appropriate. The main intent of
the regressions is to explore what factors help to best predict the use of
33
Leigh T. Graham, Permanently Failing Organizations? Small Business
Recovery After September 11, 2001, 21 ECON. DEV. Q. 299 (2007).
34
Id.
35
Id. In a recent example from Delaware County, Ohio, the revolving
loan fund program was put in jeopardy because there were few businesses
interested in taking the subsidized loans. Allison Manning, Business Loans
Now Free But No Takers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2011, at B1.
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the different incentives. Therefore, stepwise regressions are used. The
forward-selection stepwise procedure to estimate these logit regressions
starts with a model with no variables and adds variables to the model as
long as the p-value is less than 0.2 in order to find the best fitting
model. While such a procedure has some serious drawbacks, 36 it can
be useful for identifying the variables that help to predict the dependent
variable. To account for heteroscedastic error terms, robust standard
errors are estimated.
The basic model is as follows:
Equation 1: Pr(Y=1) = f(location, type of
government, past and future economic growth,
intensity of economic development efforts, barriers to
economic development)
Equation 1 is estimated for five different dichotomous dependent
variables, Y: offering of grants only (Model 1), loans only (Model 2),
grants and loans (Model 3), grants37 (Model 4), and loans38 (Model 5).
Location is captured by dummy variables capturing whether the state is
in the north-central, south, or west part of the county. The indicator for
the northeast is the excluded dummy variable. Location is also
captured by dummy variables capturing whether the government is a
core city, or for counties, a county containing a central city. A dummy
variable is also included to indicate whether the city or county is
suburban. The rural dummy is the excluded indicator. A dummy
variable is also included to capture whether the government is a county
(=1 if the government is a county).
Past growth is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
economic base grew over the past five years. Another dummy variable
is included that equals 1 if the economic base declined over the past
five years. Similarly, the respondents were asked to predict growth
over the next five years. Thus, the future growth dummy variable
equals 1 if predicted growth is expected to be positive, and the future
decline dummy variable equals 1 if predicted growth is expected to be
negative. In both cases, the excluded dummy variable is stable growth
over the past or future five years. Based upon the literature previously
36

See, e.g., M. J. R. Healy, Statistics from the Inside. 16. Multiple
Regression (2), 73 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 270, 270 (1995).
37
This coding includes governments that offer just grants and
governments that offer both grants and loans.
38
This coding includes governments that offer just loans and governments
that offer both grants and loans.
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reviewed, it is hypothesized that slower growing areas are more likely
to use both grants and loans.39
The intensity of the economic development efforts are measured
by the natural log of the economic development budget in fiscal year
2009 as well as the estimated number of jobs and business created by
past attraction efforts. It is expected that governments that use more
intensive economic development efforts are also more likely to use
grants and loans. The final set of covariates measure perceived barriers
to local economic development and include capital, population loss,
location, tax, building, and infrastructure barriers. Governments facing
barriers to economic development are hypothesized to be more likely to
adopt grants or loans.
The descriptive analysis uses survey data from the 2009
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Economic
Development Survey, which was mailed to all 3,283 municipalities
with populations of at least 10,000 and all 556 counties with
populations of 50,000 and above. While non-respondents were sent a
follow-up survey, and the survey was made available electronically, the
response rate was only 22.2%.40 Thus, care must be taken when
interpreting the descriptive analysis, as this sample is not necessarily
representative of the entire population of larger municipalities and
counties. The ICMA economic development surveys have been used in
the past to examine the adoption of economic development tools. 41 The
2009 survey asks some general questions about the local community
and how it implements its economic development strategy. The survey
also asks questions about perceived barriers to development, specific
development strategies and tools, and accountability.

39

See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2009 SURVEY SUMMARY, INT’L CITY/COUNTY
MGMT. ASS’N 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 ICMA SURVEY], available at
http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/107026/
ICMA_2009_Economic_Development_Survey_Summary.
41
See, e.g., Gary P. Green & Arnold Fleischmann, Promoting Economic
Development: A Comparision of Central Cities, Suburbs, and Nonmetropolitan
Communities, 27 URB. AFF. Q. 145 (1991); Arnold Fleischmann, Gary P. Green
& Tsz Man Kwong, What's a City to Do? Explaining Differences in Loal
Economic Develoment Policies, 45 W. POL. Q. 677 (1992) (comparing
incentive use based on the 1984 ICMA survey); Lingwen Zheng & Mildred
Warner, Business Incentive Use Among U.S. Local Governments: A Story of
Accountability and Policy Learning, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 325 (2010) (comparing
trends in incentive use based on the 1994, 1999, and 2004 ICMA surveys).
40
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Of the 844 survey respondents with usable data, 109 were
counties or parishes, while the remainder was some form of municipal
government, such as a city, village, or township. Across all types of
administrative structures, the vast majority (95.1%) reported that their
governments offer some type of business incentives. 42
Among all 844 survey respondents, 205 (24%) reported that they
offer low-cost loans, and 270 (32%) offer grants as economic
development incentives. This distribution can be seen in Table 1.
Almost 14% of the governments (114) offer both grants and loans, and
more than half (483) do not report offering either grants or loans.
Table 1. Governments offering Grants and Loans
Loans
Don’t offer*

Offer

Total

Don’t offer*

483

91

574

Offer

156

114

270

639

205

844

Grants

All

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey
*Note: “Don’t offer” includes 52 non-respondents.

If part of the justification for offering particular incentives is
either competing with or imitating the offerings in neighboring
jurisdictions, there is likely to be some spatial clustering of particular
incentives. Indeed, as Table 2 shows,43 while 24% of the governments
offer loans, this distribution ranges from a low of 19% in the southern
states to a high of 30% in the north-central states. While the southern
states are the least likely to offer loans, they are the most likely to offer
grants (43%). Northeastern states are the least likely to offer grants
(19%).

42
Fifty-two respondents did not answer this question. 2009 ICMA
SURVEY, supra note 37.
43
No surveys were returned from Hawaii or West Virginia.
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Table 2. Geographic Distribution of Governments Offering Grants and Loans
All

Offer Grants

Offer Loans

Offer Both

Region

Number

Percent
of
Total

Number

Percent
of
Region

Number

Percent
of
Region

Number

Percent
of
Region

Northeast

112

13%

21

19%

23

21%

15

13%

NorthCentral

273

32%

90

33%

82

30%

45

16%

South

265

31%

114

43%

50

19%

35

13%

West

194

23%

45

23%

50

26%

19

10%

All

844

100%

270

32%

205

24%

114

14%

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey

This geographic distribution is displayed visually in Figure 1,
which shows the darkest shading (higher percentages of responding
governments offering grants) in the in southern states, and Figure 2,
which shows that the north-central states have the highest percentage of
survey respondents offering loans.
Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Governments offering Grants

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey
Note: Hawaii and West Virginia had no survey responses
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Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of Governments offering Loans

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey
Note: Hawaii and West Virginia had no survey responses

III. RESULTS
To investigate the hypothesis that more distressed economies are
more likely to adopt economic development incentives than less
distressed areas, survey questions that asked about the performance of
the economy over the past five years were used. Respondents were
also asked to project economic performance over the next five years.
Various growth ranges were provided on the survey; then, the
numerous categories of growth ranges were converted into
dichotomous variables that equaled 1 if the reported growth was
positive (for the growth indicator) or negative (for the decline
indicator). Table 3 summarizes the previous five-year estimates and
future five-year growth predictions for governments that used neither
grants nor loans, governments that used grants or loans only, and
governments that used both grants and loans. It is clear from the table
that counties and cities that had positive growth were less likely to use
grants and loans as economic development tools, as 74% of the
governments using neither incentive had positive previous growth.
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More telling, only 10% of those governments had negative growth over
the past five years, while 16% of governments using only grants and
19% of governments using only loans had negative growth. No clear
patterns are evident among predictions of future growth or decline, as
the 9% of non-offering governments predicting future decline matched
the overall mean.
Table 3. Percent of Governments with Economic Base Growth or Decline
Past 5 Years
Incentive
Neither
Grants nor
Loans
Grants
Only
Loans
Only
Grants &
Loans
All

Predicted Future 5
Years

N

Growth

Decline

Growth

Decline

483

74%

10%

75%

9%

156

72%

16%

74%

6%

91

70%

19%

74%

9%

114

69%

19%

70%

12%

844

73%

14%

74%

9%

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey

While the governments not offering grants and loans reported
that they were more likely to have grown their economies in the past
five years, they were also less likely to attribute their growth to
economic development efforts. As shown in Table 4, governments
offering grants only or loans only claimed many more firms and jobs
created due to their efforts than the governments not offering either. As
noted above, almost all governments offered incentives, even if they
did not take the form of grants or loans. Interestingly, governments
offering both grants and loans claimed to have induced approximately
the same number of new firms (53) as the non-grant or loan offering
governments (50). However, the governments offering both grants and
loans did claim to have induced more jobs (1,978) than the nonoffering governments (1,162).
Note that this table is merely
descriptive, as it refrains not only from controlling for factors such as
the size of the local economies or the intensity of the development
efforts, but also it does not validate the estimates of jobs or businesses
created through any kind of evaluation methodology. Table 5 provides
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some indication of the intensity of the development efforts, as the
economic development budgets in fiscal year 2009 of governments
offering grants only ($1.9 million) and governments offering loans only
($2.1 million) was much larger than the average development budget of
governments offering neither grants nor loans ($0.7 million).
Table 4. Estimated Business and Job Growth over the Past Five Years
Attributed to Development Activities
Incentive
Neither Grants nor
Loans
Grants Only

N

Firms

Jobs

483

49.77

1,161.71

156

106.00

2,092.81

Loans Only

91

84.54

1,847.26

Grants & Loans

114

52.98

1,977.66

All

844

65.05

1,553.68

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey

Table 5. Fiscal Year 2009 Economic Development Budget in Millions
of Dollars
Incentive

N

Budget

Neither Grants nor Loans

483

$0.71

Grants Only

156

$1.9

Loans Only

91

$2.1

Grants & Loans

114

$1.7

All

844

$1.3

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey

Economic development incentives are typically used to attempt
to address market failures or particular competitive disadvantages in a
local economy. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for six of those
challenges, ranging from concerns regarding capital or funding to
infrastructure challenges. In almost all cases, governments using
neither grants nor loans were less likely to report these factors to be
barriers to economic development. Of note, governments offering
loans only were much more likely to claim that their geographic
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location (“distance from markets”) was a barrier (25%) than
governments offering grants only (13%) or governments offering
neither grants nor loans (14%). For tax, building availability, and
infrastructure challenges, governments offering grants only or grants
and loans found these to be larger barriers than governments offering
loans only or not offering grants or loans.
Table 6. Percentage of Governments Reporting Barriers to Economic Development
N

Capital/
Funding

Population
Loss

Distance
from
Markets

Taxes

Building
availability

Infrastructure

483

42%

6%

14%

18%

31%

41%

156

56%

10%

13%

20%

41%

62%

91

54%

11%

25%

15%

35%

57%

114

53%

15%

16%

27%

45%

78%

844

47%

9%

15%

19%

35%

51%

Incentive
Neither
Grants
nor
Loans
Grants
Only
Loans
Only
Grants &
Loans
All

Source: ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey

To estimate regressions, all of the surveys that had missing
observations for any of the variables were dropped. That left 392
surveys. The full set of descriptive statistics for all of the variables
included in the stepwise regressions for these 392 observations is
reported in Table 7. For this subset of observations, 38% provided
grants, 20% provided grants only,44 30% provided loans, 12% provided
loans only, and 18% provided both grants and loans. The vast majority
were urban or suburban: 26% were core cities or counties containing a
core city, and 55% were suburban. For the most part, these 392
observations are representative of the entire set of 844 observations
described above.45

44
45

That is, the governments did not provide loans.
2009 ICMA SURVEY, supra note 37.
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Table 7. Characteristics of Local Governments Included in Regression
Analysis
VARIABLE

Mean
(st. dev.)

Fraction of Governments Offering
Grants
Grants Only (no loans)
Loans
Loans Only (no grants)
Both Grants and Loans

0.378
(0.485)
0.196
(0.398)
0.304
(0.460)
0.122
(0.328)
0.181
(0.386)

Fraction of Governments in
Northeast
North Central
South
West

0.102
(0.303)
0.327
(0.470)
0.329
(0.470)
0.242
(0.429)

Fraction of Governments that are
Core City or County Containing a Central City
Suburban City or County
County Governments

0.255
(0.436)
0.548
(0.498)
0.140
(0.348)

Fraction of Economies Reported to Have
Grown over Past 5 Years
Declined Past 5 Years

0.755
(0.431)
0.110
(0.313)

Fraction of Economies Predicted to
Grow Next 5 Years
Decline Next 5 Years

0.750
(0.434)
0.0944
(0.293)
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12.41
(1.757)

Fraction Reporting Barriers to Economic Development
Lack of Capital or Funding
Declining Market because of Population Loss
Location too Distant from Major Markets
Taxes
Lack of Building Availability
Inadequate Infrastructure

0.513
(0.500)
0.0842
(0.278)
0.179
(0.383)
0.204
(0.404)
0.388
(0.488)
0.316
(0.466)

Natural log of the estimated
6.240
(1.590)
2.799
Businesses Created due to Attraction Efforts
(1.483)
Number of Observations
392
Source: Analysis Based on ICMA 2009 Economic Development Survey
Jobs Created due to Attraction Efforts

Regression results predicting the likelihood of using grants or
loans are reported in Table 8. One important advantage of the
regression analysis is that it is a multivariate approach. That is, it can
provide an estimate of the impact of any one of the factors on the
likelihood of offering the incentive, holding constant the other factors.
The coefficients are reported in Table 8 if they loaded in the model—
that is, if the p-value associated with the coefficient was less than 0.2
when the stepwise procedure entered the variable into the model. The
coefficients from the logit regression, when positive, are interpreted
such that the presence of that variable (for the dichotomous variables)
or an increase in the variable (for the continuous variables) leads to an
increased probability of the government offering the particular
incentive. Negative coefficients indicate a decreased probability of
offering the incentive.
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Table 8. Stepwise (Forward Selection) Logit Results of Models
Predicting Likelihood to Adopt Grants or Loans as Economic
Development Incentives
Coefficient
North Central
Location
South Location
West Location
Core City or
County
Containing a
Central City
Suburban City
or County
County
Government
Economy
Reported to
have Declined
Past 5 Years
Economy
Predicted to
Decline Next 5
Years
Natural Log
FY09
Economic
Development
Budget
Lack of Capital
or Funding
Development
Barrier
Location too
Distant from
Major Markets
Development
Barrier
Lack of
Building
Availability
Development
Barrier

(1)
Grants
Only

(2)
Loans
Only

(3)
Grants &
Loans

1.528**
(0.0368)
2.082***
(0.00399)
1.707**
(0.0191)

(4)

(5)

Grants

Loans

0.564**
(0.0476)
-1.097**
(0.0117)

-0.567*
(0.0751)
-1.274***
(0.00335)

0.599**
(0.0361)

0.953**
(0.0251)
0.890**
(0.0276)
0.856**
(0.0218)

-0.892***
(0.00203)
-0.671**
(0.0291)
-0.640*
(0.0826)

-0.715*
(0.0782)
-0.774
(0.194)

-0.898***
(0.00163)
-0.563
(0.198)

-0.410*
(0.0755)

1.112***
(0.00691)

1.083***
(0.00319)

-1.045*
(0.0580)

-0.679
(0.107)

0.233**
(0.0330)

0.188**
(0.0251)

0.130*
(0.0977)

-0.601*
(0.0707)

0.570**
(0.0405)

0.595***
(0.00884)

0.689
(0.119)

0.301
(0.195)

-1.415***
(7.63e-06)
-0.762**
(0.0476)

0.280***
(0.00062)
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Inadequate
Infrastructure
Development
Barrier
Natural log
Estimated Jobs
Created due to
Attraction
Efforts
Natural log
Estimated
Businesses
Created due to
Attraction
Efforts

0.537
(0.128)
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0.353
(0.183)

-0.386***
(0.00791)

0.142*
(0.0811)

0.326**
(0.0197)

-0.166
(0.129)

0.178*
(0.0798)

Constant

-4.066***
(1.49e-07)

-2.769**
(0.0366)

-3.238***
(0.00262)

-3.700***
(6.13e-05)

-2.478***
(0.00857)

Observations

392

392

392

392

392

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When examining the location variables, the location coefficients
are interpreted relative to the northeastern states, as the northeast
variable is the excluded location dummy variable. 46 Consistent with
the descriptive analysis, observations from southern states were
statistically significantly more likely to offer grants only. Interestingly,
compared to northeastern states, being in a north-central or western
state also increased the probability that the government offered grants
only (Model 1). In the model predicting all grant-offering governments
(Model 4), only the north-central and south coefficients were included
in the model as significant regressors. For loans only (Model 2) and all
loans (Model 5), governments in southern states were less likely to
offer loans, all else equal. The impact of locational factors for the
governments offering both grants and loans (Model 3) is similar to
those offering loans.
Other factors helping to predict governments offering only grants
(Model 1) include being in an urban area (both the core city and
suburban variables loaded), being a county government rather than a
municipality, and having endured economic decline over the past five
years. However, respondents predicting economic decline over the
next five years were less likely to have adopted grants.
46
In models 2-5, additional location dummy variables were not loaded
into the model. For each of these models, the coefficients on the location
dummy variables are interpreted relative to all of the excluded categories.
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Unlike with the grants regressions and with the descriptive
analysis in Table 3, past economic decline did not help to predict
governments using only loans (Model 2). Also, being a suburban
government reduced the probability that a government would offer
loans. For the all-loans regression (Model 5), being a core city or
county containing a central city also reduced the likelihood of offering
loans. This finding that governments in urban areas are less likely to
offer loans may be why the north-central coefficients did not load in the
all-loans regressions despite the visual evidence in Figure 2. After
controlling for whether the local government was in an urban area, the
actual location in the rural northeast did not matter. Consistent with the
descriptive statistics in Table 5, governments with larger economic
development budgets were more likely to offer loans. Interestingly, the
more jobs estimated to have been created due to economic attraction
efforts, the lower the probability that the government offered loans.
However, the more businesses estimated to have been created due to
development efforts, the more likely the government offered loans.
This may be evidence that loans have been targeted more frequently at
attracting businesses than at expanding employment.
For the most part, the coefficients on the variables measuring
barriers to economic development were not significant in the
multivariate analysis. The one exception is the dummy variable
capturing the perception that lack of capital and funding was a barrier.
For the governments that reported this barrier, they were less likely to
offer loans (Model 2)47 and more likely to offer grants and loans
together (Model 3) or offer any grants (Model 4). This result for loans
is somewhat surprising, as loans directly address capital market
imperfections.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The descriptive analysis in this paper was consistent with
previous research that has generally found that more distressed
communities are more likely to adopt economic development
incentives. In the bivariate analysis, governments that used grants,
loans, or both were more likely to have faced economic decline over
the previous five years than were governments that used neither grants
nor loans. However, in the stepwise logit regression analysis, which
controls for the influence of other factors, previous economic decline
47

This, however, is statistically significant only at the 10% level.
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was only useful in helping to predict grant use. Perhaps these
governments facing economic distress felt the need to use incentives
that provided a more generous benefit to the recipient firms. Or,
perhaps consistent with the analysis of Peters and Fisher, these
distressed governments were constrained in their ability to offer lowinterest loans.48
The findings were also somewhat consistent with previous
findings that incentive use may be influenced by either competition or
by imitative behavior. The maps showed some clustering of incentive
use, where grants tended to be more highly utilized in southern states
and loans in the north-central states. The regression analysis was
consistent with the finding that southern states were more likely to use
grants. The regressions also found that southern states were less likely
to use loans. However, the multivariate regression analysis did not find
that north-central states were more likely to use loans. Perhaps the
bivariate analysis was driven partially by the fact that the north-central
states tend to have fewer governments, and hence fewer governments in
the survey. Thus, the finding in the bivariate analysis that a higher
percentage of these governments used loans may have been spurious.
However, the regression results did find that suburban governments
were less likely to use loans and did not find any relationship between
central cities and loan use; therefore, perhaps the greater use of loans in
the north-central states is due more to their rural status than to their
geographic location. Being a central or suburban location did increase
the probability that a government used grants.
Governments spending more on economic development efforts
used more grants and loans on average, and this result was significant
for all but the grants-only regression. In the regression analysis,
business attraction, and not job creation, was related to loan use,
providing evidence that governments participating in the survey used
loans more as a tool for business attraction rather than job creation.
Finally, while governments facing barriers to development were
more likely to use grants and loans based on the bivariate analysis, only
the lack of capital or funding as a barrier was a statistically significant
factor in the regression analysis. Governments facing financing
barriers, contrary to expectations, were less likely to use loans but were
more likely to use grants.

48
See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development
Incentives, 70 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, 27 (2004), available at
www.crcworks.org/cfscced/Fisher.pdf.
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This analysis shows that while grants and loans are often used in
some similar circumstances, there are also some important differences
that help distinguish their use. While many of the findings were
consistent with expectations, care must be taken not to attribute the
results to the larger population of local governments given that the
response rate to the 2009 ICMA Economic Development survey was
only 22%.49 Whether or not grant use or loan use is a more effective
local economic development tool should be the focus of future
research.

49

2009 ICMA SURVEY, supra note 37.
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